Seminar: Anti-Corruption Reforms and Shareholder Valuations | Event Study Evidence from China

Seminar: Anti-Corruption Reforms and Shareholder Valuations | Event Study Evidence from China

Friday, December 1, 2017
1:00 pm - 2:00 pm

International Affairs Building, 420 W. 118 St., New York, NY 10027 Room 1101

The Center on Global Economic Governance and the Center for Development Economics and Policy invite you to attend a seminar given by Bernard Yeung (National University of Singapore) on the impact of anti-corruption reforms on shareholder valuations.

Dr. Yeung is Dean and Stephen Riady Distinguished Professor in Finance and Strategic Management at the National University of Singapore (NUS) Business School. Before joining NUS in June 2008, he was the Abraham Krasnoff Professor in Global Business, Economics and Management at New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business. He obtained a PhD from the University of Chicago.

Abstract: Consistent with reduced expected corruption adding value overall, Chinese shares rise sharply on the December 4th 2012 launch of major anti-corruption reforms starting with curtailing extravagant spending by or for Party cadres. SOEs gain broadly, consistent with the reform cutting their top managers’ (all Party cadres) spending on private benefits. NonSOEs gain in more liberalized provinces, consistent with reduced expected bribes to officials (also Party cadres) for getting business done. NonSOEs lose in provinces where market institutions remain weak, consistent with bribes for “greasing bureaucratic gears” still being a key resource allocation mechanism there. Firm level regressions reveal more productive nonSOEs in more growth potential and external finance-dependent industries gaining more in more liberalized provinces, consistent with investors expecting reduced corruption to improve resource allocation more where market institutions are more developed.

Read the full paper here